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Abstract 10 
There is growing research interest in behavioural spillover and its potential for promoting more 11 
widespread lifestyle change than has typically been achieved through discrete behavioural 12 
interventions. There are some routes by which spillover could take place without conscious attention 13 
or explicit recognition of the connections between separate behaviours. However, in many cases there 14 
is an expectation that an individual will perceive behaviours to be conceptually-related, specifically 15 
in terms of their compensatory (suppressing further action) or catalysing (promoting further action) 16 
properties, as a prerequisite for both negative and positive spillover. Despite this, relatively little 17 
research has been carried out to assess the beliefs that may underpin spillover processes as held by 18 
individuals themselves, nor to measure these directly. We develop and evaluate a survey-based 19 
instrument for this purpose, doing so in a sample of seven countries worldwide: Brazil, China, 20 
Denmark, India, Poland, South Africa, and the UK (approx. 1,000 respondents per country). This 21 
approach allows us to assess the properties of these measures and to compare findings between 22 
countries. As part of this, we consider the connections between beliefs about behavioural 23 
relationships, and other key variables such as pro-environmental identity and personal preferences. 24 
We observe higher levels of endorsement of compensatory beliefs than previous research, and even 25 
higher levels of endorsement of novel items assessing catalysing beliefs. For the first time, we 26 
present evidence of the validity of such measures with respect to comparable constructs, and in 27 
relation to people’s consistency across different types of behaviours. We reflect on the implications 28 
of considering the relationships between behaviours in the context of people’s subjective beliefs, and 29 
offer recommendations for developing this line of research in the broader context of spillover 30 
research and within a cross-cultural framework.   31 
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1 Introduction 32 
Recent years have seen a growth in research that has set out to promote, understand, and test 33 
behavioural spillover in the environmental domain. Behavioural spillover is broadly defined as an 34 
observable and causal effect one behaviour has on another (Nash et al., 2017). Research in this area 35 
has been founded on an appreciation of the limited capacity for individual, piecemeal behaviour 36 
change to address urgent environmental problems (Maniates, 2001), especially through simple, low-37 
effort individual action (Thøgersen and Crompton, 2009). The prospect that such behaviours might 38 
nevertheless prompt or catalyse more broad-based behaviour change, has generated interest in the 39 
relationship between environmentally-significant behaviours, and the conditions under which one 40 
action might ‘spill over’ to another (Defra, 2008). Similarly, evidence that interventions to promote 41 
pro-environmental behaviour may be undermined by ‘rebound’ effects (e.g., installing domestic 42 
insulation leading to greater energy use) highlights a need to understand how and why these 43 
apparently inconsistent behaviours may occur and ultimately to reduce their occurrence.  44 
While there are various proposed mechanisms for how spillover works, most assume that they 45 
require some degree of conscious reflection – for example, justifying inconsistent behaviours (e.g., 46 
eating cake after exercising) or motivating consistent ones (e.g., giving money to charity leading to 47 
volunteering). Yet, while patterns of compensatory and catalysing behaviours have been explored – a 48 
central objective of spillover research – individuals’ own beliefs about these behaviours have 49 
received relatively lesser attention. In the present study, we consider how compensatory and 50 
catalysing beliefs relate to pro-environmental behaviours, as well as to underlying psychological 51 
constructs. In order to examine these beliefs in light of the types of behavioural patterns that would 52 
be anticipated as a result of spillover processes, we also examine whether and how they are linked to 53 
consistency across self-reported behaviours. 54 
2 Spillover mechanisms and the role of beliefs about behaviour 55 
Recent reviews focusing specifically on spillover of pro-environmental behaviour (PEB) have 56 
highlighted several mechanisms by which the process might occur, as well as different perspectives 57 
on what is encompassed or excluded from the concept of spillover itself (Truelove et al., 2014; Nash 58 
et al., 2017; Nilsson et al., 2017). While there is the potential for spillover to occur automatically or 59 
outside of a person’s awareness, much research indicates that conscious emotional, self-perception or 60 
mental accounting processes are activated in triggering this process. The types of conscious 61 
reasoning and justification typical to spillover are neatly articulated by Dolan and Galizzi’s (2015) 62 
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explanation of the processes by which one type of healthy or unhealthy behaviour (running or sofa-63 
sitting) can lead to another (eating more or less healthily). The concept of ‘promoting’ (positive) 64 
spillover occurs when behaviours work together; for example, “I ran an hour, let’s keep up the good 65 
work”. In ‘permitting’ (negative) spillover, behaviours work against each other; for example, “I ran 66 
an hour, I deserve a big slice of cake”. Similarly, permitting spillover might also be triggered by the 67 
sofa-sitter concluding that “I’ve been lazy today, let’s have a big slice of cake”. ‘Purging’ spillover 68 
(moral cleansing) occurs when an actor attempts to reduce negative feelings after indulging, taking 69 
the view that “I’ve been lazy today, best not eat so much tonight”.  70 
Of particular relevance to the present study, Nash et al. (2017) point to the potential for self-71 
perception to underpin spillover: the idea that reflecting on past behaviour provides cues for people 72 
for how to act subsequently. In a related manner, though drawing on a different strand of theory, it 73 
has also been argued that spillover may be underpinned by people’s desire for consistency in their 74 
actions and with their values, not least because the perception of inconsistency – or dissonance – can 75 
be psychologically uncomfortable (Sapiains, 2015).  76 
While people’s awareness of the links between behaviours can promote positive spillover (i.e. one 77 
‘good’ behaviour leading to another) equivalent processes may operate that could undermine this, or 78 
operate in a reverse manner. For example, Nilsson et al. (2017) outline in some detail the types of 79 
reasoning or rationalisation that might underpin negative spillover, with the notion of ‘moral 80 
licensing’ held to be central. This entails a person balancing the ‘good’ of one action with the ‘bad’ 81 
of another: having carried out one pro-environmental behaviour they may consider that they have 82 
earned the right (or ‘licence’) to act in another, less pro-environmental manner (Khan and Dhar, 83 
2006; Merritt et al., 2010); or they may simply be of the view that having now done their share, they 84 
have reduced their obligation to take further action. 85 
3 The role of psychological and cultural factors as influences on spillover and behavioural 86 
consistency  87 
Pro-environmental action is influenced by a range of factors including people’s values, general 88 
beliefs and identity (Hornsey et al., 2016). In relation to spillover in particular, as well as consistency 89 
across behaviours, a person’s pro-environmental identity has been argued to be critical. From a 90 
theoretical perspective, it is a person’s ‘self-identity’ – their concept of themselves – that is used to 91 
guide actions. In the environmental domain, this manner of self-identity has been shown both to be a 92 
significant predictor of pro-environmental behaviour (Sparks and Shepherd, 1992), and been 93 
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proposed as a factor that promotes behavioural consistency (Whitmarsh and O’Neill, 2010). Several 94 
studies have furthermore assumed a central role for pro-environmental identity in enabling spillover 95 
processes. For example, experimental work has shown that drawing attention to the environmental 96 
impacts of choices, can lead to a heightened sense of one’s pro-environmental self-identity, which in 97 
turn can promote subsequent actions in line with this self-perception (Cornelssen et al., 2008; van der 98 
Werff et al., 2013). More generally, research has also shown that the potential exists for people to 99 
evaluate their behaviours in their context of their identity: for example, Gneezy et al. (2012). argue 100 
that high-cost behaviours in particular may be perceived by a person to reflect a pro-social identity, 101 
and consequently to raise the likelihood of further pro-social action. Given the centrality of identity 102 
to spillover research, and to pro-environmental behaviour more generally, we seek to understand its 103 
relationship to the types of beliefs that are a focus of the present study. We conceptualise pro-104 
environmental identity in terms of the self-concept, which stresses how a person sees themselves, in 105 
the context of their environmental concerns and behaviours. In this we draw on research by 106 
Whitmarsh and O’Neill (2010) who developed the identity scale we apply in the present study. 107 
Although less considered in the environmental psychology literature, a separate strand of research 108 
has also highlighted how people’s preference for consistency (PFC) is related to patterns of 109 
behaviour. PFC refers to the idea that people value behavioural characteristics that are stable, 110 
predictable and reliable (Guadagno and Cialdini, 2010). Whereas more general theoretical 111 
frameworks have tended to assume by default that people are motivated to be consistent to an 112 
equivalent degree, the PFC framework proposes that, instead, there are individual differences in the 113 
extent to which people’s actions are congruent with past and similar behaviour (Guadagno and 114 
Cialdini, 2010). For example, Cialdini et al. (1995) found that PFC moderated how susceptible 115 
people were to the ‘foot-in-the-door’ effect, in which the request to carry out a small action allows 116 
for a subsequent, larger request to be met; this effect has itself been used often as an analogue of 117 
spillover (Nash et al., 2017). Given the demonstrated utility of PFC as a construct that underpins 118 
behavioural consistency in general terms, we are interested to understand the extent to which it is 119 
related to the types of beliefs considered in the present study. 120 
As we outline above, there is evidence for individual differences in behavioural consistency and PFC. 121 
In a related manner, cross-cultural research has indicated that there are differences in the extent to 122 
which societies tolerate ambiguity; this has been linked to cultural variability in uncertainty 123 
avoidance (the degree to which a society challenges or is accepting of unpredictability: Hofstede, 124 
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2001). Variation in tolerance of ambiguity, in turn, has direct implications for how a person’s 125 
underlying values influence their behaviour (Furnham and Ribchester, 1995; Boer and Fischer, 126 
2013). In particular, and in a manner analogous to the individual-level need to manage cognitive 127 
dissonance, individual and societal differences in this area may affect the extent to which people 128 
accept and manage personal (in)consistency (Boer and Fischer, 2013).  129 
In line with the expectation that behavioural consistency – and by implication, spillover processes – 130 
is likely to vary across cultures and countries, in the present study we assess the endorsement, and 131 
implications, of compensatory and catalyzing beliefs across several different nations, including non-132 
Western contexts. This builds on prior work which has addressed spillover in research primarily 133 
carried out in Europe and North America. Given the almost complete absence of cross-national 134 
comparative work on spillover in general – and the role of underlying beliefs in particular – we are 135 
interested to ascertain the extent to which our findings are obtained consistently across countries. 136 
4 Measurement and predictive ability of compensatory and catalyzing beliefs  137 
Despite conceptual and theoretical reasons to expect that the types of catalyzing and compensatory 138 
beliefs outlined above might be related to a person’s pro-environmental behaviour, there has been 139 
surprisingly little research that has directly addressed this.  140 
One study that did set out to directly assess beliefs of this kind was work by Kaklamanou et al. 141 
(2015), who devised a 16-item measure of ‘compensatory green beliefs’. This was designed to assess 142 
the extent to which people endorsed beliefs about one type of pro-environmental behaviour 143 
compensating for another. As these authors pointed out, such compensatory beliefs have been more 144 
widely considered in the health domain, with some research finding a relationship with health risk 145 
behaviours and dietary temptations (Knäuper et al., 2004; Albarracin et al., 2009). Indeed, these and 146 
other studies have found compensatory health beliefs are related to intentions to quit smoking 147 
(Radtke et al., 2011) and other health risk behaviours such as drinking alcohol and unhealthy eating 148 
(Knäuper et al., 2004).   149 
The compensatory beliefs scale devised by Kaklamanou et al. (2015) covered a range of behaviours 150 
and posited relationships between them. For example, items included the proposition that “If you 151 
have a low flush toilet, then it is okay to use more water in other ways” and “Composting food waste 152 
can make up for buying imported food”, each referring to trade-offs within domains (water and food, 153 
respectively). Behaviour pairs were also proposed that were cross-domain, such as “Walking to the 154 
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supermarket can compensate for buying highly packaged food” and “Having a water butt can 155 
compensate for using the oven”. 156 
The study by Kaklamanou et al. (2015) found that the compensatory beliefs scale was negatively 157 
associated with ecological worldview and pro-environmental identity; and that the scale also 158 
predicted self-reported pro-environmental behaviour over and above these variables. This suggests 159 
these beliefs tended to be connected to relatively less pro-environmental views and actions, in line 160 
with the exculpatory tone of the phrasing used. For the most part, the items used tended to have low 161 
levels of agreement. In all but five cases, participant agreement with the statements presented was 162 
lower than 10%, with the highest level of agreement being for a travel-related proposition, “not 163 
driving a car compensates for flying on holiday” (16.2% agreement); this particular statement may 164 
also have chimed with Barr et al.’s (2010) finding that holiday-related behaviours were seen as 165 
particularly distinct from everyday domestic choices in the home.  166 
Overall, the low levels of agreement found by Kaklamanou et al. may have reflected that such 167 
compensatory green beliefs are relatively uncommon, or that the particular examples used were not 168 
endorsed. There is also the possibility that people’s willingness to equate their own views with 169 
compensatory beliefs may have been affected by social desirability, whereby such beliefs could be 170 
considered disagreeable. Nevertheless, these findings parallel an earlier study by Bratt (1999) in 171 
which levels of endorsement of three compensatory statements were also found to be low: indeed, in 172 
that study the item presenting a trade-off between not driving and flying on holiday was agreed with 173 
by a similar proportion of respondents, at 17.1%.  174 
Building on this earlier work, Byrka and Kaminska (2015) argued that a useful avenue to develop an 175 
understanding of compensatory beliefs was to consider them in terms of their relative similarity and 176 
difficulty. In particular, these authors suggested that compensatory behaviours are more likely to 177 
operate as such if they fall under the same category of behaviour (similarity of domain) than if they 178 
are dissimilar. As such, it might be expected that an item referring to compensating for buying 179 
imported food by composting, would be seen as more plausible than compensating for using an oven 180 
by using a water butt – to use examples taken from the work by Kaklamanou et al. (2015). Indeed, 181 
Byrka and Kaminska (2015) made the argument that across the items developed for that earlier study, 182 
the most-endorsed did indeed tend to be those that reflected within-domain trade-offs.  183 
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This study by Byrka and Kaminska (2015) proposed, in addition, that behaviours which were easier 184 
than the preceding ‘target’ behaviours would be more likely to be endorsed in terms of a 185 
compensatory process, than would a more difficult choice. For example, the reuse of a carrier bag 186 
obtained from a store would be seen as a plausible compensatory act, in part due to its being a simple 187 
action to perform; in contrast to using environmentally-friendly cleaning products to compensate for 188 
using an insecticide. Across their analyses, these authors found that endorsement of compensatory 189 
beliefs was higher where target and compensatory behaviours were in the same domain, and where 190 
the compensatory behaviour was easier than the target behaviour. 191 
Other research by Seebauer (2018) has used measures designed to test rebound effects of acquiring 192 
an electric car or carrying out home insulation; as well as items that presented these actions in terms 193 
of compensatory behaviours for other environmentally-significant choices (for example: “I use an 194 
electric car, so it doesn’t matter much if I fly on a holiday every now and then”). As in the studies 195 
described above, this research found that compensatory beliefs were negatively associated with pro-196 
environmental values. In addition, some evidence was presented that rebound behaviours – for 197 
example, reporting that one covered more miles with an electric vehicle than before – was also 198 
associated with compensatory beliefs. 199 
In addition to survey-based work that has assessed the prevalence and measurement of compensatory 200 
beliefs, recent qualitative research by Hope et al. (2018) has shed light on their nature – as well as the 201 
ends to which they might be put. These authors suggest that compensatory beliefs can serve 202 
important functions in terms of enabling people to affirm their own environmental credentials (even 203 
though they may be aware of other actions that are less desirable), to justify some (harmful) actions, 204 
and to reduce their negative feelings about their impact on the environment.  205 
5 Aims of the present study 206 
The studies considered above have shed light on the prevalence of certain types of belief of relevance 207 
to spillover processes and behavioural consistency. However, there are a number of limitations to the 208 
research carried out to date that we seek to address. 209 
First, the focus of prior work has been almost exclusively upon people’s justification for 210 
inconsistency across pro-environmental behaviours. In all cases, the measures described above are 211 
framed in terms of a ‘negative’ behaviour balanced against a ‘positive’ one – either being presented 212 
in terms of negative action that is permitted on account of taking other, positive behaviour; or in 213 
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terms of a positive action compensating for other, negative action (hence the use of the term 214 
‘compensatory’ beliefs). However, prior work has not reflected the potential for equivalent processes 215 
whereby one positive action might give rise to another. In the present study, we therefore develop a 216 
new measure of ‘catalysing’ beliefs, intended to complement this former construct. Our concept of a 217 
catalyzing belief is one that views behaviours as positively related, whereby action in one area is 218 
understood as a trigger for action in another. Given the conceptual linkages between ‘compensatory’ 219 
and ‘catalysing’ beliefs and spillover, we refer in places to both of these as constituting ‘spillover-220 
related’ beliefs. 221 
Second, previous work has set out to measure compensatory beliefs exclusively in terms of trade-offs 222 
between defined pro-environmental behaviours: for example, between use of a car and donating to an 223 
environmental organisation. Although this approach enables a comparison between types of pro-224 
environmental behaviours, such as similarity and difficulty as in Byrka and Kaminska (2015)’s study, 225 
these measures have not allowed for an examination of more generalised compensatory beliefs. In the 226 
present study, we build on this prior work through an assessment of more general beliefs about the 227 
relationships between behaviours, as well as between specified behaviour pairs. 228 
Third, although the measures used to date have been considered in the context of other 229 
environmentally-significant measures, such as pro-environmental identity, ecological worldview, and 230 
personal norms, there has not yet been an attempt to validate scales or items with reference to 231 
conceptually-related constructs. As well as assessing a link with pro-environmental identity in the 232 
present study, we also consider our measures of spillover-related beliefs in relation to Cialdini at al.’s 233 
(1995) notion of personal consistency and their ‘preference for consistency’ scale, in order to address 234 
the convergent validity of the scales we present. We consider these relationships separately across 235 
countries, and for the dataset as a whole, in order to offer an extension of previous research that has 236 
occurred in the context of a single country study. 237 
Fourth, while previous work has been able to assess compensatory belief measures in relation to 238 
several indicators of pro-environmental behaviour, there has to date been no analysis of whether and 239 
how the scales and items used actually reflect relationships between behaviours. It remains unclear, 240 
for example, whether those who endorse compensatory beliefs show related patterns of behaviour in 241 
line with this. We are interested here to assess the linkages between different types of behaviour, 242 
rather than cross-national differences. For this reason we use aggregated data and analyses from 243 
participants across countries to assess this study aim. 244 
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Finally, the research assessing these types of beliefs has, to date, been able to do so only in 245 
homogenous settings and primarily in European or other ‘Western’ nations. In the present study, we 246 
consider the application of measures across diverse cultures, extending our survey research to Brazil, 247 
China, India, and South Africa, as well as the European countries of Denmark, Poland and the UK. 248 
We approach this in an exploratory manner, without a pre-specified hypothesis, in order to 249 
characterize similarities or differences in the presence of such beliefs across different national 250 
contexts. 251 
Our research questions are as follows: 252 
(1) To what extent are compensatory and catalysing behavioural beliefs endorsed in different 253 
national contexts? 254 
(2) To what extent are compensatory and catalysing beliefs related to pro-environmental identity 255 
and preference for consistency? 256 
(3) To what extent are compensatory and cataylsing beliefs related to self-reported pro-257 
environmental behaviour?  258 
(4) To what extent are compensatory and catalysing beliefs related to consistency across different 259 
self-reported pro-environmental behaviours? 260 
 261 
Based on previous work which has found correlations between compensatory beliefs, pro-262 
environmental identity and pro-environmental behaviour, we anticipate that the measures used here 263 
will demonstrate similar associations. We also offer additional predictions based on further novel 264 
components to this study. Our hypotheses are as follows: 265 
H1. Pro-environmental identity will negatively predict compensatory beliefs (H1a), and pro-266 
environmental identity will positively predict catalysing beliefs (H1b). 267 
H2. Preference for consistency will negatively predict compensatory beliefs (H2a), and 268 
preference for consistency will positively predict catalysing beliefs (H2b). 269 
H3. Compensatory beliefs will negatively predict pro-environmental behaviour (H3a), and 270 
catalysing beliefs will positively predict pro-environmental behaviour (H3b). 271 
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H4. Compensatory beliefs will negatively predict consistency across different behaviours 272 
(H4a), and catalysing beliefs will positively predict consistency across different behaviours 273 
(H4b). 274 
 275 
Hypotheses H1 and H2 assess aspects of the second research question (links between psychological 276 
constructs and spillover-related beliefs). Hypotheses H3 and H4 are derived from research questions 277 
3 and 4, respectively (levels and patterns of self-reported behaviour). 278 
 279 
6 Methods 280 
Participants and design 281 
Participants were recruited through the research panel provider Qualtrics. We used quota sampling in 282 
order to ensure the participant pools in each of the surveyed countries was representative by age, 283 
gender and income, based on publicly available national statistics. In selecting for age, we used bands 284 
(e.g. 18-24, 25-24, 35-44 etc.) which we matched to national demographics (e.g. in the UK to that 285 
provided by the Office for National Statistics). For all countries, the median age band was 35-44 286 
years of age; with the exception of the UK and Denmark where this was 45-54 years of age. We 287 
quota sampled for personal income, based on a country’s income quintiles, such that the samples 288 
obtained reflected a range of income brackets. We sought to obtain a 50:50 split for gender, while 289 
allowing respondents to self-identify in another way than male or female. While we did not quota 290 
sample for education, this information was obtained through a survey item. There was a reasonable 291 
spread of levels of education, although this may have been skewed somewhat towards those with a 292 
higher level of education: while it is problematic to compare across countries given different systems, 293 
around two-thirds (63%) of the sample had a graduate-level qualification. 294 
Participants completed survey questionnaires online between March and November 2016, receiving a 295 
small compensation for participating (credits administered by the panel provider). The median time 296 
taken to complete the survey was 29 minutes 50 seconds.  The full sample of respondents comprised 297 
6,969 individuals, approximately 1,000 people per country surveyed (although due to problems with 298 
obtaining a full sample in Poland, numbers were lower here at n=658; in India we obtained a sample 299 
n=985, with just over n=1,000 in other countries). 300 
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For each of the surveyed countries, items were translated by professional translators, and 301 
subsequently double-checked by a second professional translator. In addition, collaborators based in 302 
academic institutions in each of the countries surveyed were involved in checking for meaning and 303 
transferability to that country’s context. 304 
6.1 Measures 305 
Items were administered in blocks of questions, using the online survey randomisation feature to 306 
preclude ordering effects.  307 
The survey incorporated a range of measures, not all reported or analysed here. The following items 308 
and scales are those considered in the present study. 309 
Compensatory beliefs 310 
We measured moral licensing using nine items, developed in part to build on earlier work by 311 
Kaklamanou et al. (2015). The items were designed to reflect specific behaviour pair trade-offs as 312 
well as more general compensatory beliefs. Items included statements such as ‘If I save electricity 313 
through switching off appliances, I am entitled to use it in other ways such as by turning up the 314 
heating’ and ‘Doing some things that are positive for the environment means I am allowed to do 315 
other things that are less environmentally-friendly’. Participants were asked the extent to which they 316 
agreed or disagreed with each statement, on a scale from ‘1’ (entirely disagree) to ‘7’ (entirely agree). 317 
The full list of items is given in Table 1, together with descriptive statistics for overall levels of 318 
agreement. The compensatory beliefs items formed a reliable scale in all countries; alpha scores 319 
obtained were as follows: Brazil (α=.76), China (α=.84), Denmark (α=.78), India (α=.87), Poland 320 
(α=.73), South Africa (α=.81), UK (α=.86). 321 
Catalysing beliefs 322 
We measured what we term ‘catalysing’ beliefs using four novel items. These were designed to 323 
mirror the types of statements used to reflect compensatory beliefs, but in contrast to convey the 324 
belief that undertaking positive pro-environmental behaviour was associated with taking further 325 
action in that vein. The items used in all cases were intended to convey a generalised belief in this 326 
catalysing property of pro-environmental behaviour. Items included the statements ‘Doing something 327 
positive for the environment in my everyday life makes me want to do other similar things’ and ‘If I 328 
manage to do one small thing for the environment, it gives me the sense that bigger changes in my 329 
lifestyle are possible’. Participants were asked the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each 330 
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statement, on a scale from ‘1’ (entirely disagree) to ‘7’ (entirely agree). The full list of items is given 331 
in Table 1, together with descriptive statistics for overall levels of agreement. The catalysing beliefs 332 
items formed a reliable scale (fair to excellent alpha scores) in all countries; alpha scores obtained 333 
were as follows: Brazil (α=.71), China (α=.77), Denmark (α=.66), India (α=.71), Poland (α=.69), 334 
South Africa (α=.71), UK (α=.81). 335 
Pro-environmental identity 336 
Seven items were used to measure pro-environmental identity, using items adapted from previous 337 
research (Whitmarsh and O’Neill, 2010) as follows: ‘Taking action to protect the environment is an 338 
important part of who I am’, ‘I would describe myself as an ’environmentalist’’, ‘I would not want 339 
anyone to think of me as someone who is concerned about reducing waste’ (reverse-scored), ‘I would 340 
not want my family or friends to think of me as someone who is concerned about environmental 341 
issues’ (reverse-scored), ‘I am the type of person who tries not to be wasteful’, ‘ ‘I think of myself as 342 
an environmentally-friendly person’, and ‘I would be embarrassed to be considered a “waste-343 
conscious” person’ (reverse-scored). Participants were asked the extent to which they agreed or 344 
disagreed with each statement, on a scale from ‘1’ (entirely disagree) to ‘7’ (entirely agree). The pro-345 
environmental identity items formed a fairly reliable scale across countries, though with somewhat 346 
lower alpha scores than those obtained for other scales; alpha scores obtained were as follows: Brazil 347 
(α=.59), China (α=.70), Denmark (α=.72), India (α=.53), Poland (α=.58), South Africa (α=.65), UK 348 
(α=.75).  349 
Preference for consistency 350 
We used seven items taken or adapted from Cialdini et al.’s (1995) preference for consistency scale, 351 
as follows: ‘It is important to me that my actions are consistent with my beliefs’, ‘Admirable people 352 
are consistent and predictable’, ‘I get uncomfortable when I find my behaviour contradicts my 353 
beliefs’, ‘I’m uncomfortable holding two beliefs that are inconsistent’, ‘It doesn’t bother me much if 354 
my actions are inconsistent’ (reverse-scored), ‘It is important to me that those who know me can 355 
anticipate what I will do’, and ‘I want to be described by others as a stable, predictable person’. 356 
Participants were asked the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each statement, on a scale 357 
from ‘1’ (entirely disagree) to ‘7’ (entirely agree). The preference for consistency items formed a 358 
reliable scale in all countries; alpha scores obtained were as follows: Brazil (α=.64), China (α=.62), 359 
Denmark (α=.72), India (α=.62), Poland (α=.70), South Africa (α=.70), UK (α=.77). 360 
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Pro-environmental behaviour 361 
We used a battery of 20 items designed to measure self-reported incidence of carrying out a range of 362 
pro-environmental behaviours. These items were derived in part from previous studies of pro-363 
environmental behaviours (e.g. Whitmarsh and O’Neill, 2010) and from qualitative research 364 
previously carried out in six of seven of the surveyed countries (Nash et al., under review). 365 
Participants were asked to state the frequency with which they had carried out these behaviours, on a 366 
scale from ‘0’ (not at all in the past year) to ‘10’ (at least once a day). The full list of items is given in 367 
Table 6, together with descriptive statistics. Pro-environmental behaviours included in the battery 368 
include those relating to ‘private-sphere’ (i.e., consumer or domestic) action (see Stern, 2000), 369 
including ‘avoided wasting food (e.g. by using leftovers)’ and ‘bought environmentally friendly 370 
products’ as well as ‘public-sphere’ (i.e., political or social) action, including ‘encouraged other 371 
people to save energy’ and ‘donated money to an environmental campaign group’. Due to ethical and 372 
practical considerations, Chinese respondents were asked four items in substitution for the more 373 
politically-sensitive items. 374 
In order to assess the latent structure – and hence behaviour ‘types’ – across the pro-environmental 375 
behaviour items, we carried out a principal components analysis. Given the use of several alternative 376 
or modified items in the China survey (e.g. relating to ‘voting’ or ‘protest’), we carried out this 377 
analysis on data from the remaining six countries: Brazil, Denmark, India, Poland, South Africa, and 378 
the UK. Principal components analysis was undertaken based on eigenvalues >1 and using Varimax 379 
rotation. We used a Varimax (orthogonal) rotation in order to derive distinct (uncorrelated) principal 380 
components; this enables us to compare consistency across different types of pro-environmental 381 
behaviour, as we describe below. An alternative approach using oblique rotation (in which principal 382 
components are permitted to correlate) reveals a similar latent structure to that described below. We 383 
did not apply this approach, however, given our particular interest in the extent to which people 384 
varied in their consistency across different types of behaviour; we consider it would have been 385 
problematic to calculate differences between factor scores – our approach to operationalizing 386 
‘consistency’ – had those factors been known to be substantially correlated. 387 
The factor structure of the pro-environmental behaviour items for the six-country dataset is shown in 388 
Table 1, with factor loadings above .4 shown in bold. The types of pro-environmental behaviour 389 
obtained fall under three fairly neatly delineated categories. Factor 1 encompasses public-sphere 390 
behaviour (e.g. signing a petition, donating money) incorporating one behaviour relating to finding 391 
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out more about climate change; factor 2 encompasses resource-use and waste-avoidance behaviours, 392 
including limiting water and energy usage, as well as recycling; factor 3 encompasses purchasing as 393 
well as food-related behaviours (e.g. buying environmentally-friendly products). For subsequent 394 
analyses we name the factors accordingly. As we discuss below, we use factor scores in our analyses, 395 
however we also note that measures of alpha corresponding to each of the three factors indicate 396 
acceptable to excellent reliability (assuming items with loadings > .4, factor 1 α=.90, factor 2 α=.66, 397 
factor 3 α=.74). 398 
 399 
Table 1 about here 400 
 401 
Analytic approach 402 
We adopt several, related approaches in order to address the study’s research questions and 403 
hypotheses. In the first instance, we describe the distributional properties of the compensatory and 404 
catalysing beliefs scale. This enables us to compare the extent to which they are endorsed across the 405 
seven countries. Next, we carry out simple linear regressions to assess the extent to which pro-406 
environmental identity is predictive of compensatory and catalysing beliefs. We examine the 407 
relationship between these beliefs and preference for consistency in a similar manner.  408 
In order to consider the relationship between the spillover-related constructs and pro-environmental 409 
behaviour, we first assess the extent to which compensatory and catalysing beliefs relate to different 410 
types of pro-environmental behaviour, based on the factor analysis of behaviours. Having done so, 411 
we then examine consistency between behaviour types and whether this is related to compensatory 412 
and catalyzing beliefs.  413 
We adopt the approach of using factor scores for each of the three principal components (factors), 414 
which in each case represents a score weighted to reflect the relative loading of items within the 415 
factor. In this, we follow the ‘weighted sum scores’ approach described by DiStefano et al. (2009). 416 
The use of factor scores enables us to obtain a participant score for each behaviour type, that can be 417 
treated as an outcome variable in linear regression analyses. 418 
In order to develop an indicator of consistency between behaviour types, we calculate the positive 419 
difference between factor scores for each participant, across the three factors. For example, to 420 
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calculate the difference between factors 2 and 3, we use the following equation, where D is the 421 
positive value of the difference between the two factor scores and where FAC2 and FAC3 represent 422 
scores for factors 2 and 3: 423 
D = √ ((FAC2 – FAC3)2) 424 
This enables us to quantify the extent to which each participants’ pro-environmental behaviour is 425 
relatively consistent across behaviour types (a small positive value for D) or relatively inconsistent (a 426 
large positive value for D). We carry out this assessment of difference for each of the pairs of factors 427 
(i.e. factor 1 vs factor 2; factor 1 vs factor 3; and factor 2 vs factor 3). 428 
In the first stage of our linear regression analyses, we include compensatory or catalysing beliefs 429 
only, as predictors; at the next stage, we also include pro-environmental identity and preference for 430 
consistency as predictor variables. In this, we mirror the approach used by Kaklamanou et al. (2015) 431 
who sought to assess the extent to which such beliefs were uniquely predictive of pro-environmental 432 
behaviour (as opposed to only reflecting more general pro-environmental tendencies) while also 433 
considering the role of PFC. Given the previously observed relationship between spillover-related 434 
beliefs and pro-environmental identity, we also examine collinearity across these analyses; we do not 435 
find any evidence that this is problematic (VIF<1.5 in all cases). 436 
 437 
7 Results 438 
7.1 Endorsement of compensatory and catalysing beliefs 439 
As can be seen in Table 2, average levels of endorsement – where a participant stated they ‘entirely’, 440 
‘mostly’ or ‘somewhat’ agreed with the statement – varied from 15.9% (‘It doesn't matter how much 441 
energy I use when I'm at work or out of the house, as long as I try to be 'green' at home’) to 81.8% 442 
(‘If I act in a manner that benefits the environment, it makes me more aware of other similar actions I 443 
can take’) across the full seven-country sample. Table 1 also shows the countries for which the 444 
lowest and highest levels of agreement were obtained.  445 
 446 
Table 2 about here 447 
 448 
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The overall distributional properties of both scales are shown in Figure 1. As can be seen here, 449 
relative to the other surveyed countries, responses are skewed and/or flattened in the case of India 450 
(compensatory beliefs), and Brazil and India (catalysing beliefs). 451 
 452 
Figure 1 about here 453 
 454 
7.2 Relationship of belief types to pro-environmental identity and preference for consistency 455 
Linear regressions were used to assess whether, and to what extent, pro-environmental identity 456 
predicts compensatory beliefs. This was undertaken separately for each of the seven countries. Table 457 
3 shows B and Beta coefficients for pro-environmental identity as a predictor variable, with the 458 
compensatory beliefs scale treated as the dependent variable. 459 
In all cases, the analysis supports the H1a prediction that identity and compensatory beliefs are 460 
inversely related. Pro-environmental identity explains between 5% and 21% of the variance in 461 
compensatory beliefs (adjusted R2 values), as shown in Table 3.  462 
 463 
Table 3 about here 464 
 465 
We carried out a similar set of regressions to assess whether, and to what extent, pro-environmental 466 
identity predicts catalysing beliefs. In all cases, the analysis supports the H1b prediction that identity 467 
and catalysing beliefs are positively related. Pro-environmental identity explains between 15% and 468 
37% of the variance in compensatory beliefs (adjusted R2 values), as shown in Table 4.  469 
 470 
Table 4 about here 471 
 472 
We next carried out linear regression to assess whether, and to what extent, preference for 473 
consistency predicts compensatory beliefs. Table 5 shows results obtained; in all cases, B and Beta 474 
coefficients shown are for preference for consistency as a predictor variable, with the compensatory 475 
beliefs scale treated as the dependent variable. 476 
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Our prediction of a negative relationship between these two constructs, H2a, was not supported. In 477 
only two of seven countries was a significant relationship obtained, and with only small amounts of 478 
variance explained.  479 
 480 
Table 5 about here 481 
 482 
Further regression analysis support the prediction, H2b, that preference for consistency and 483 
catalysing beliefs are positively related. Preference for consistency explains between 6% and 28% of 484 
the variance in catalysing beliefs (adjusted R2 values), as shown in Table 6.  485 
 486 
Table 6 about here 487 
 488 
7.3 Relationship between pro-environmental behaviour and belief types 489 
We next assess the extent to which the different types of pro-environmental behaviour (PEB) 490 
described above, are related to compensatory and catalysing beliefs.  491 
As can be seen from Table 7, although a significant relationship is observed in all cases between 492 
compensatory beliefs and PEB, there is a divergence between the direction in which compensatory 493 
beliefs are predictive of PEB. In the case of resource/waste PEB and purchasing/food PEB the 494 
expected negative relationship is found; however, in the case of public-sphere PEB, a positive 495 
relationship is observed. These relationships hold when controlling for pro-environmental identity. 496 
Our hypothesis that compensatory beliefs would be inversely related to PEB, H3a, is therefore only 497 
partially supported. 498 
Table 7 about here 499 
 500 
In the case of the relationship between PEB and catalysing beliefs (Table 8), our hypothesis, H3b, is 501 
more clearly supported: catalysing beliefs are predictive of each of the three PEB types, and this 502 
relationship holds where pro-environmental identity is also included in the regressions. An 503 
unexpected negative relationship is observed between pro-environmental identity and one of the 504 
factors at step 2. It is not clear why this result is obtained, given that pro-environmental identity is, on 505 
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its own, positively associated with each factor. As we note above, we do not identify any concerns 506 
with collinearity in our regression analyses. Nevertheless, the relatively strong overall association 507 
between identity and catalyzing beliefs, as illustrated in Table 4, may indicate that this finding is an 508 
anomaly due to a relatively large degree of variance being shared between identity and catalyzing 509 
beliefs, in predicting PEB.  510 
Table 8 about here 511 
 512 
 513 
As shown in Table 9, our analyses confirm our prediction, H4a, that compensatory beliefs are related 514 
to behavioural inconsistency. In each case, compensatory beliefs significantly and positively predict 515 
the degree of divergence between different types of PEB. The relationship is strongest for 516 
inconsistency between public-sphere and consumption PEBs.  517 
 518 
Table 9 about here 519 
 520 
As shown in Table 10, our analyses do not support the prediction, H4b, that catalysing beliefs are 521 
related to behavioural consistency. We find a mix of divergent and inconsistent results here, as well 522 
as very low R2 values attributable to catalysing beliefs, suggesting either a null or non-predicted 523 
relationship between these two variables.  524 
 525 
Table 10 about here 526 
 527 
 528 
8 Discussion 529 
The present study considers individuals’ beliefs in relation to how certain behaviours are thought of 530 
as triggering, justifying, or compensating for other behaviours. Our research is the most detailed 531 
exploration to date of the content, measurement, and relationships with other key indicators, of such 532 
spillover-related beliefs. 533 
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Our compensatory beliefs scale was found to have acceptable to good internal consistency 534 
(reliability) across the seven countries in which we were able to administer it; as did the 4-item 535 
catalysing beliefs scale we devised. In the case of some specific measures used, we observed similar 536 
levels of endorsement as comparable previous research: for example, 16.2% of respondents in the 537 
Danish sample endorsed the view that reduced car use can compensate for flying on holiday, an 538 
identical figure to that obtained for an equivalent item used by Kaklamanou et al. (2015) with a UK 539 
sample. However, in contrast to previous research, for the most part we obtained substantially higher 540 
levels of agreement with the compensatory scale as a whole, as well as for specific items. We suggest 541 
there are two main reasons for this.  542 
First, this was likely related to the use of items which did not exclusively affirm specific relations 543 
between predetermined behaviours or contexts. Whereas other research has tended to present specific 544 
behaviour pairs in relation (or opposition) to one another, in the present study we also framed this in 545 
terms of more general statements. We also note the important caveat that the items used in the 546 
compensatory beliefs scale used some behaviour-specific items, whereas the catalyzing beliefs scale 547 
used wording that reflected more general behavioural relations. This is likely to have influenced the 548 
overall higher levels of endorsement of the catalyzing beliefs scale, as compared to the compensatory 549 
scale. 550 
While we used several belief items that imply a more general relation between behaviours, in this, the 551 
statements we propose may well reflect an overlooked aspect of how compensatory beliefs operate in 552 
practice; rather than being rigidly tied to specific choices, a person’s beliefs may instead constitute an 553 
adaptable and generalised perspective on one’s own behaviour in aggregate. This is in line with 554 
qualitative research by Hope et al. (2018), which argued that participants saw behavioural 555 
compensation on a cumulative and holistic level rather than in relation to distinct behavioural 556 
relations; these researchers likewise suggested that participant perspectives were at odds with survey 557 
items in which “single, predefined compensatory actions are pitted against one another”. 558 
A second reason for the relatively higher levels of agreement with the compensatory scale used in the 559 
present study, is likely to relate to our use of cross-national samples, and variability in country-level 560 
response distributions. While this was not especially pronounced across the seven countries as a 561 
whole, it is noteworthy that Indian respondents in particular were more inclined to agree with these 562 
items, whereas those from Denmark were least likely to endorse them (Danish respondents were, 563 
indeed, also relatively less likely to endorse catalyzing beliefs). Some aspect of this is likely to relate 564 
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to cross-cultural differences in survey responding, including the tendency for ‘acquiescent 565 
responding’ (i.e. tendency to agree with statements) to vary cross-nationally (Johnson et al., 2005). It 566 
is worth noting in this regard that many of the seminal and influential studies of spillover have in fact 567 
been undertaken in Denmark (e.g. Thøgersen and Ölander, 2003; Lanzini and Thøgersen, 2014); 568 
which, from our research at least, would seem to comprise a population that is strongly inclined to 569 
reject compensatory beliefs.  570 
Our use of a catalysing belief scale revealed surprisingly high endorsement of the items proposed. 571 
While cross-country variability in patterns of responding is again evident – in particular, the scale 572 
distribution is skewed for the India and Brazil country samples – nevertheless participants across all 573 
countries appeared far more inclined to endorse catalysing than compensatory beliefs. The wording 574 
of items could have reflected some aspect of people’s general pro-environmental attitudes or 575 
tendencies, as we note above, but it is of interest that the most-endorsed catalysing beliefs item was 576 
one that most clearly presented the idea that one’s personal actions are linked in a positive manner. 577 
As with the compensatory beliefs scale, there may have been some sense in which these items were 578 
influenced by acquiescent responding, with this in turn varying on a cross-national basis. It is of note, 579 
however, that there does not appear to be a straightforward equivalence in responding by country, 580 
between the two belief types. In particular, whereas relatively high levels of agreement are found for 581 
this scale in Brazil and India, an equivalent pattern – whether in the same direction or inverse – is not 582 
shown for these countries for the compensatory beliefs scale. 583 
We suggest that pursuing a deeper understanding of catalysing beliefs – and similar constructs – 584 
offers a promising, and potentially constructive approach, to considering the ways in which people 585 
perceive their pro-environmental behaviour as a whole. A large majority of people (around 90%) in 586 
Europe now report that they personally take action on climate change (Eurobarometer, 2017); where 587 
opportunities exist to make positive connections between such current, future or recent action, 588 
particularly in relation to beliefs to which people widely subscribe, this could facilitate more 589 
widespread behaviour change. The research literature already recognises that there are multiple 590 
processes by which positive spillover can in principle occur – whether through a ‘foot in the door’ 591 
approach (Thøgersen and Noblet, 2012), through self-identity (van der Werff, 2014), or promoting 592 
self-efficacy (Lauren et al., 2016). However, our research suggests that one under-appreciated feature 593 
may be people’s own beliefs about the ways in which their own behaviours can be considered 594 
mutually reinforcing across choices and contexts. 595 
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In line with previous research, we have examined the extent to which spillover-related beliefs relate 596 
to pro-environmental (or ‘green’) identity, which is known to be both a precursor to action and 597 
relevant to behavioural spillover (Nash et al., 2017; Whitmarsh and O’Neill, 2010; van der Werff, 598 
2014). As in prior work, we also observe a negative association between identity and compensatory 599 
beliefs; conversely we find a positive association between catalysing beliefs and identity. 600 
An advance offered through the present research, moreover, is an assessment of a link between our 601 
measures of spillover-related beliefs and preference for consistency (Cialdini et al., 1995). In doing 602 
so, we consider whether these beliefs are correlated with a related and comparable construct which is 603 
not so straightforwardly associated with environmental concern and action. This enables us to assess 604 
the construct validity of spillover-related beliefs, in a way that has not previously been addressed.  605 
We do observe a strong association between preference for consistency and catalysing beliefs, across 606 
the countries surveyed. This enables us to have some confidence in this novel measure, given that our 607 
view of catalyzing beliefs encompasses the idea of consistency across behaviours. Conversely, we do 608 
not find that preference for consistency is inversely related to compensatory beliefs, as predicted. In 609 
this latter case, we speculate that where people subscribe to compensatory beliefs, this may not be as 610 
straightforwardly related to a lack of personal ‘consistency’. In particular, the characterizations of 611 
behaviour across the compensatory items arguably do not preclude the idea of a logical pattern in 612 
one’s choices, albeit that this would be one that views one behaviour as allowing for, or offsetting 613 
another. In this sense, to report that one favours ‘consistency’, as in the preference for consistency 614 
items, may not be at odds with a view of behaviours counterbalancing each other. 615 
We did observe a positive relationship between catalysing beliefs and each of three types of pro-616 
environmental behaviour. However, our hypothesis that compensatory beliefs would inversely 617 
predict pro-environmental behaviour was not supported. While this held in the case of private sphere 618 
(resource and waste) behaviour, there was no clear or strong relationship with private sphere 619 
(purchasing and food) behaviour and we unexpectedly observed a positive relationship with the 620 
cluster of public sphere behaviours, such as protesting or donating money.  621 
One possible explanation for this may relate to the relatively high effort nature of the public sphere 622 
behaviours used, and their potential to allow a person to consider themselves to have ‘done their bit’ 623 
had they carried them out. In line with a compensatory view, where people had taken such effortful 624 
action as contacting a politician or volunteering, this may be linked to feeling less obligated to take 625 
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pro-environmental behaviour in other areas. Although we did not anticipate such a finding, it would 626 
be in line with other research that has linked negative spillover to ‘single action bias’ (Weber, 2010). 627 
Other work has found that people who carry out more private-sphere pro-environmental behaviour 628 
may in turn be less inclined to offer support for environmental policy (Werfel, 2017); in the present 629 
research, our results hints at a relationship that might operate in the reverse direction also.  630 
A direct assessment of how spillover-related beliefs might relate to behavioural (in)consistency, was 631 
carried out in further analyses in the present study. This we argue is important to address, given that 632 
these spillover-related beliefs are, in essence, concerned with relations between behaviours as much 633 
as with pro-environmental behaviours in aggregate. 634 
In support of our hypothesis, we observed a consistent finding across the three types of pro-635 
environmental behaviour, whereby endorsement of compensatory beliefs predicts inconsistency 636 
between different types of behaviours. The most pronounced effect observed was for inconsistency 637 
between public sphere behaviour and private sphere purchasing/food choices, suggesting that those 638 
holding compensatory beliefs are more likely to be inconsistent across these domains; this may be in 639 
terms either of relatively high levels of private sphere choices combined with lower levels of public 640 
sphere action, or vice versa.  641 
We did not, however, find an association between catalysing beliefs and behavioural inconsistency; 642 
across the series of regressions carried out, this relationship was variously non-significant, negative 643 
or positive. Moreover, the amount of variance explained by the catalyzing belief scale in these cases 644 
was relatively small, suggesting that this construct did not have a great deal of explanatory power 645 
here. One reason for this may be that the characterizations of behaviour in the catalyzing beliefs scale 646 
would be more applicable across very similar types of behaviours, and rather less predictive of 647 
consistency between the distinct categories we assessed (e.g., in our case, between public sphere 648 
action and resource use behaviours). This would seem to be in line with the notion that spillover is 649 
more likely to occur between very similar types of behaviour, than between ones perceived to be 650 
different (Nash et al., 2017). Given the lack of a clear pattern here, we cannot in any case be 651 
confident that the catalysing beliefs scale we developed is related to behavioural patterns, despite that 652 
we have found that it does convincingly predict overall levels of pro-environmental behaviour. In 653 
relation to this, we recommend further developing the idea of ‘catalysing’ beliefs in more detail and 654 
depth, as this construct has received little attention outside the present study; as part of this, there 655 
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may be opportunities to devise additional or complementary measures beyond the four items that we 656 
developed. 657 
 658 
9 Study limitations and future research 659 
The present study has obtained some support for the validity and reliability of spillover-related 660 
beliefs, as well as considering findings in the context of seven country samples. There are 661 
nevertheless some limitations to the research and areas of future development. 662 
First, we are limited in our ability to make strong claims about the construct validity of the 663 
compensatory beliefs scale, given that this was not found to be related to preference for consistency 664 
as expected. Nevertheless, compensatory items were found to predict both overall levels of behaviour 665 
as well as behavioural (in)consistency, suggesting their potential usefulness in future work. 666 
Conversely, while we did observe that catalyzing beliefs were related to preference for consistency 667 
and overall levels of pro-environmental behaviour – supporting the construct validity and predictive 668 
ability of this novel scale – this was nevertheless unrelated to behavioural (in)consistency. The lack 669 
of an association in this latter case raises questions over the ability of our novel catalyzing belief 670 
scale to explain patterns or linkages between behaviours, this being the aim of much spillover-related 671 
research. 672 
We have considered the use of the compensatory and catalysing beliefs measures in different cultural 673 
contexts, and observe some distinct differences in how people respond in these locations. It is not 674 
clear from our research whether this is linked to cross-cultural differences in response styles, 675 
fundamental differences in the extent to which people in different settings endorse such beliefs, or a 676 
combination of both. To date, there has been very little cross-cultural research concerning spillover 677 
and related topics, particularly outside of a developed country context. We therefore suggest that 678 
further attention is given as to whether these phenomena are generalizable and equivalent across 679 
different populations.  680 
As in the case of much research in environmental psychology and related fields, we are limited by the 681 
use of self-report measures derived from a survey instrument. It would therefore be of value for these 682 
spillover-related beliefs to be tested in relation to observed behaviour – and patterns of behaviour – 683 
including in experimental contexts. In future research, it will be of value to link patterns of beliefs to 684 
more objective measures, such as home energy use or the recording of dietary choices. 685 
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Further testing and development of these types of measures in relation to comparable constructs 686 
would be valuable, in order to further test and develop their validity. There are a range of theoretical 687 
models of relevance to behavioural consistency, for example (e.g. see Mullen and Monin, 2016, for 688 
an overview of approaches) which may have bearing on the ways in which people hold such beliefs, 689 
or are inclined to act upon them.  690 
 691 
10 Conclusion 692 
The present study has progressed the understanding of spillover-related beliefs in several novel 693 
directions, providing the most detailed exploration to date of this topic area. Our research is, to our 694 
knowledge, the first to develop and assess a role for ‘catalysing’ beliefs, as well as considering those 695 
that are ‘compensatory’. In the case of both belief types, we have developed measures that portray 696 
generalised beliefs about patterns of behaviour, in contrast to prior research which has relied on 697 
presenting linkages between specific types of action.  698 
Our measures have been found to be reliable and to be associated with key psychological and 699 
behavioural measures, although our hypotheses were only partially supported in some cases: in 700 
particular, while we found support for our prediction that compensatory beliefs would be related to a 701 
lack of consistency between behaviour types, the relationship was less straightforward in the case of 702 
catalysing beliefs. The present research is the first, as far as we are aware, to consider spillover-703 
related beliefs in the light of convergent constructs, through a comparison with a person’s ‘preference 704 
for consistency’ and the degree to which they report (in)consistency across different types of 705 
behaviour. We have also examined spillover-related beliefs for the first time in a cross-cultural 706 
context, including outside of a developed country setting. While we observe similar relationships 707 
between our key measures across cultures, divergence in the degree to which they are endorsed 708 
warrants further attention.  709 
A priority for future research will be to assess how patterns of behaviour and behavioural consistency 710 
are connected to spillover-related beliefs, as well as considering compensatory and catalysing beliefs 711 
in more detail in the context of theoretically-related constructs. 712 
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Table 1 Factor structure and descriptive statistics of pro-environmental behaviours 829 
across six countries (Brazil, Denmark, India, Poland, South Africa, UK)  830 
 Component  
1 2 3 Mean (S.D.) 
Took part in a protest about an environmental issue .807 -.068 .141 0.84 (1.83) 
Got involved in conservation work to protect natural 
environments (e.g. national parks, coastline) 
.802 .059 .162 1.43 (2.37) 
Offered support (e.g. by voting) for political action to 
protect the environment 
.797 .047 .142 2.40 (2.24) 
Contacted a politician about an environmental issue .779 -.105 .091 0.66 (1.64) 
Signed a petition about an environmental issue .770 .041 .111 1.37 (2.17) 
Donated money to an environmental campaign group .741 -.022 .207 1.16 (1.88) 
Done something together with neighbours, people at work 
or friends to address an environmental issue 
.686 .081 .301 1.77 (2.40) 
Found out more about environmental issues (e.g. learning 
more about climate change) 
.575 .244 .344 3.33 (2.71) 
Avoided buying new things (e.g. clothes, luxury items) .338 .269 .237 3.60 (2.79) 
Avoided wasting food (e.g. by using leftovers) .054 .712 .129 7.36 (2.09) 
Avoided littering (throwing rubbish on the street) -.116 .684 -.015 8.10 (1.92) 
Turned off the tap when brushing teeth -.028 .669 .061 8.07 (2.21) 
Turned off lights when not in use -.140 .630 .130 8.25 (1.76) 
Taken short showers (less than 3 minutes long) or 
infrequent baths 
.172 .536 .182 6.12 (3.08) 
Recycled household waste (e.g. glass, plastic, food waste) .134 .408 .161 5.82 (3.14) 
Encouraged other people to save energy .378 .394 .339 4.40 (2.93) 
Eaten organic, locally-grown or in season food .131 .160 .787 4.96 (2.80) 
Bought environmentally-friendly products .227 .158 .769 4.50 (2.48) 
Bought products with less packaging .229 .261 .694 4.50 (2.59) 
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Avoided eating meat .204 .066 .529 3.10 (3.29) 
 831 
 832 
  833 
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Table 2. Items and descriptive statistics for Compensatory and Catalysing Beliefs scales (all 834 
countries)  835 
Compensatory beliefs 
Item Mean 
(SD) 
% agree  
(cross-
national) 
Highest % 
agree  
(country) 
Lowest % 
agree 
(country) 
Doing some things that are 
positive for the environment 
means I am allowed to do other 
things that are less 
environmentally-friendly 
3.25 
(1.92) 
26.2% 42.4% 
(India) 
14.6% 
(Denmark) 
As long as I take a few simple 
actions to protect the 
environment then that is enough 
4.24 
(1.63) 
47.6% 67.0% 
(Poland) 
29.8% 
(Denmark) 
I already try to help out on 
environmental issues; I am not 
prepared to change my lifestyle 
any further 
3.95 
(1.59) 
36.7% 45.7% 
(Poland) 
27.9% 
(South 
Africa) 
If I save electricity through 
switching off appliances, I am 
entitled to use it in other ways 
such as by turning up the heating 
3.40 
(1.95) 
29.4% 51.4% 
(China) 
6.6% 
(Denmark) 
As long as I 'do my bit' to help 
the environment at home, there 
is no need to worry about doing 
this at work or in other situations 
2.84 
(1.75) 
18.4% 46.2% 
(India) 
8.5% 
(Denmark) 
The environmental impact of 
flying on holiday can be made 
up for by reducing one's car use 
at other times 
4.13 
(1.61) 
39.5% 66.8% 
(India) 
16.2% 
(Denmark) 
Reducing my environmental 
impact at home (e.g. by 
recycling) helps to compensate 
for any environmental impacts I 
have at work or elsewhere 
3.92 
(1.84) 
41.4% 62.2% 
(India) 
26.0% 
(Denmark) 
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It doesn't matter how much 
energy I use when I'm at work or 
out of the house, as long as I try 
to be 'green' at home 
2.68 
(1.69) 
15.9% 38.6% 
(India) 
4.9% 
(Denmark) 
If a person has a diet that is 
environmentally-friendly, this 
compensates for any 
environmental harm from them 
burning petrol/diesel in cars 
3.03 
(1.76) 
20.7% 41.7% 
(India) 
3.6% 
(Denmark) 
Full scale; 
Equivalent per item 
 
31.43 
(10.25) 
3.49 
(1.14) 
   
Catalysing beliefs 
Item Mean 
(SD) 
% agree  
(cross-
national) 
Highest % 
agree  
(country) 
Lowest % 
agree 
(country) 
Being environmentally-friendly 
is not about taking small actions, 
it is a complete approach to life 
5.43 
(1.58) 
77.0% 92.8% 
(China) 
59.7% 
(Denmark) 
Doing something positive for the 
environment in my everyday life 
makes me want to do other 
similar things 
5.33 
(1.28) 
76.7% 91.8% 
(India) 
58.8%  
(Denmark) 
If I manage to do one small thing 
for the environment, it gives me 
the sense that bigger changes in 
my lifestyle are possible 
5.30 
(1.35) 
75.9% 91.5% 
(India) 
44.8% 
(Denmark) 
If I act in a manner that benefits 
the environment, it makes me 
more aware of other similar 
actions I can take 
5.44 
(1.24) 
81.8% 93.3%  
(India) 
66.6%  
(UK) 
Full scale; 21.53 
(4.22); 
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Equivalent per item 
 
5.38 
(1.06) 
 836 
 837 
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Table 3 Relationship between green identity and compensatory beliefs 839 
 840 
Country  Correlation 
(Pearson’s r) 
R2  
 
Brazil -.29*** .09 
China -.44*** .19 
Denmark -.41*** .16 
India -.46*** .21 
Poland -.23*** .05 
South Africa  -.39*** .15 
UK -.42*** .17 
Full dataset -.36*** .13 
*** p<.001 841 
 842 
 843 
Table 4 Relationship between green identity and catalysing beliefs 844 
Country  Correlation 
(Pearson’s r) 
R2  
Brazil .53*** .28 
China .61*** .37 
Denmark .49*** .24 
India .39*** .15 
Poland .53*** .28 
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South Africa  .54*** .29 
UK .60*** .36 
Full dataset  .27 
*** p<.001 845 
 846 
 847 
Table 5 Relationship between preference for consistency and compensatory beliefs 848 
Country  Correlation 
(Pearson’s r) 
R2  
Brazil .19*** .04 
China -.04 (ns) .00 
Denmark .02 (ns) .00 
India .13*** .02 
Poland -.06 (ns) .00 
South Africa  .02 (ns) .00 
UK .04 (ns) .00 
Full dataset .12*** .01 
*** p<.001 849 
 850 
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Table 6 Relationship between preference for consistency and catalysing beliefs 855 
Country  Correlation 
(Pearson’s r) 
R2  
Brazil .26*** .07 
China .53*** .28 
Denmark .27*** .07 
India .38*** .15 
Poland .31*** .10 
South Africa  .34*** .11 
UK .40*** .16 
Full dataset .41*** .16 
*** p<.001 856 
  857 
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 858 
Table 7  Relationships between PEB factors and compensatory beliefs  859 
 Dependent variable: 
public-sphere PEB  
(factor 1) 
Dependent variable: 
resource/waste PEB 
(factor 2) 
Dependent variable: 
purchasing/food 
(factor 3) 
 B (SE) Beta R2  
(Δ R2) 
B 
(SE) 
Beta Δ R2 
(Δ R2) 
B (SE) Beta Δ R2 
(Δ R2) 
Step 1   .16   .05   .003 
Compensatory 
beliefs 
.04 
(.001) 
.39***  -.02 
(.001) 
-.21***  -.005 
(.001) 
-.05***  
Step 2   .19 
(.04) 
  .17 
(.12) 
  .06 
(.06) 
Compensatory 
beliefs 
.05 
(.001) 
.46***  -.01 
(.001) 
-.09*  .004 
(.001) 
.04**  
Green identity .03 
(.002) 
.21***  .06 
(.002) 
.37***  .04 
(.002) 
.26***  
 860 
 861 
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Table 8  Relationships between PEB factors and catalysing beliefs  864 
 Dependent variable: 
public-sphere PEB  
(factor 1) 
Dependent variable: 
resource/waste PEB 
(factor 2) 
Dependent variable: 
purchasing/food 
(factor 3) 
 B (SE) Beta R2  
(Δ R2) 
B 
(SE) 
Beta Δ R2 
(Δ R2) 
B (SE) Beta Δ R2 
(Δ R2) 
Step 1   .10   .08   .06 
Catalysing 
beliefs 
.07 
(.003) 
.31***  .06 
(.003) 
.28***  .06 
(.003) 
.24***  
Step 2   .11 
(.02) 
  .17 
(.09) 
  .08 
(.02) 
Catalysing 
beliefs 
.09 
(.003) 
.39***  .02 
(.003) 
.10***  .03 
(.003) 
.15***  
Green identity -.02 
(.002) 
-.15***  .06 
(.002) 
.35***  .03 
(.002) 
.17***  
 865 
 866 
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Table 9 Relationships between PEB inconsistency and compensatory beliefs  869 
 Dependent variable:   
factor 1 vs factor 2 scores 
Dependent variable:   
factor 2 vs factor 3 scores 
Dependent variable:   
factor 1 vs factor 3 scores 
 B 
(SE) 
Beta Δ R2 
(Δ R2) 
B 
(SE) 
Beta Δ R2 
(Δ R2) 
B 
(SE) 
Beta Δ R2 
(Δ R2) 
Step 1   .11   .02   .04 
Compensatory 
beliefs 
.03 
(.001) 
.33***  .01 
(.001) 
.12***  .02 
(.001) 
.19***  
Step 2   .11 
(.003) 
  .03 
(.02) 
  .04 
(.002) 
Compensatory 
beliefs 
.03 
(.001) 
.31***  .01 
(.001) 
.08***  .02 
(.001) 
.20***  
Green identity -.01 
(.002) 
-.06***  -.02 
(.002) 
-.13***  .004 
(.002) 
.03*  
Pref. for 
consistency 
.00 
(.002) 
-.001 (ns)  -.004 
(.002) 
-.03 (ns)  .005 
(.002) 
.03* 
(ns) 
 
 870 
Factor 1 = public-sphere PEB; factor 2 = resource/waste PEB; factor 3 = purchasing/food PEB 871 
 872 
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Table 10 Relationships between PEB inconsistency and catalysing beliefs  875 
 876 
 Dependent variable:   
factor 1 vs factor 2 
scores 
Dependent variable:   
factor 2 vs factor 3 
scores 
Dependent variable:   
factor 1 vs factor 3 scores 
 B  
(SE) 
Beta Δ R2 
(Δ R2) 
B 
(SE) 
Beta Δ R2 
(Δ R2) 
B  
(SE) 
Beta Δ R2 
(Δ R2) 
Step 1   .002   .01   .01 
Catalysing 
beliefs 
.01 
(.003) 
.04**  -.02 
(.003) 
-
.10*** 
 .02 
(.003) 
.09***  
Step 2   .05 
(.05) 
  .02 
(.02) 
  .02 
(.01) 
Catalysing 
beliefs 
.04 
(.003) 
.17***  -.003 
(.003) 
-.02 
(ns) 
 .03 
(.003) 
.14***  
Green 
identity 
-.04 
(.002) 
-.26***  -.02 
(.002) 
-
.15*** 
 -.02 
(.002) 
-.11***  
Pref. for 
consistency 
.003 
(.002) 
.02 (ns)  -.001 
(.002) 
-.003 
(ns) 
 .001 
(.002) 
.03*   
 877 
Factor 1 = public-sphere PEB; factor 2 = resource/waste PEB; factor 3 = purchasing/food PEB 878 
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Figure 1 Distributional properties of compensatory and catalysing beliefs scales 883 
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